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Abstract
The present paper develops an overlapping generations model that interacts
with a labor market characterized by equilibrium unemployment. This struc-
ture implies that young individuals can be in two different states, employed
or unemployed. Hence, the social security system contains both old-age ben-
efits and unemployment insurance. Including these features the model seeks
to assess growth effects of three different pension systems: one unfunded and
two funded, where it is separated between actuarial and non-actuarial funding
strategies. It is shown that both funded systems generate higher growth than
an unfunded system. Moreover, the actuarial system fosters higher growth than
the non-actuarial.
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1 Introduction
Several OECD countries experience population ageing due to low fertility rates and
higher life expectancies. At the same time many of these countries are plagued with
high unemployment rates due to structural problems. A third observation is that
many of these economies also suffer from a decline in productivity and slow economic
growth. All of these issues are closely related to how the social security program is
formed, and consequently social security reforms are highly prioritized on the policy
agenda.
Since most of these countries have unfunded pension systems, population ageing
will trigger increased tax burdens and/or reduced benefits in the future. This can
affect savings. These issues have caused several countries to reform their social secu-
rity systems. Typical changes have involved more funding strategies and changes in
retirement incentives, in order to motivate workers to stay longer in the workforce.
In most European economies these issues are accompanied by unemployment prob-
lems. High unemployment rates have been observed for a long time. Although there
doesn’t exist a consensus theory on this long-term unemployment, most economists
agree on that the problems have some structural flavor and can be associated with
institutional arrangements, such as the wage formation or the social security system
and welfare programs (Ljungqvist and Sargent, 1998; Layard et al., 1991). As so-
cial security has an impact on both employment issues and saving decisions, social
security must also be linked to economic growth.
In this paper I will analyze the relationship between different social security
systems, unemployment and economic growth. To do this an overlapping generations
model in discrete time is applied, where the young generation can be in two different
states, either employed or unemployed. The extent of unemployment is related to
the wage bargaining. The old generation is assumed to be non-working. As the
model economy consists of two groups that are non-working, the social security
system contains both unemployment insurance and old-age pension benefits. These
characteristics and institutional features are relevant for European welfare states
and labor markets.
Several papers have treated these issues separately, and the focus has often been
on different aspects of the features mentioned above analyzed in isolation. The rela-
tion between pensions and growth is typically analyzed in intertemporal models as
treated in Breyer (1989), Saint-Paul (1992) and Lambrecht et al. (2005). Motivated
by the pension reform debate several authors have studied the transition from a
non-funding pension scheme to a more or completely funded system (Verbon, 1989;
Peters, 1991; Thøgersen, 2001). The shift is known to have a short-run cost, as the
transition generation is constrained to pay twice, both for its own retirement and
for the old part of the population through a pay-as-you go scheme. From a social
welfare point of view the shift is therefore problematic. In Belan et al. (1998) how-
ever, the transition is studied in an endogenous growth model, and it is shown that
a Pareto-improving social security reform is possible.
The link between social security and unemployment is however, ignored in this
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literature, and usually studied in a separate class of models. Aghion and Howitt
(1999) and Pissarides (2000) studies unemployment and growth when unemployment
is due to search frictions and mismatch, while Bra¨uninger (2000) and Lingens (2003)
study the same variables, but based on the presumption that unemployment is
caused by the wage bargaining.
Corneo and Marquardt (2000) take a first step in integrating social security, un-
employment and growth, where social security refers to the combination of public
pensions and unemployment insurance programs. The labor market in their model
is characterized by union wage setting, where the wage is set by a monopoly union.
They find that unemployment does not affect growth and that the Pareto-improving
pension reform studied in Belan et al. (1998) is maintained even when allowing for
equilibrium unemployment. Bra¨uninger (2005) studies the same relations as Corneo
and Marquardt, but he assumes that the wage is determined through wage bar-
gaining. Bra¨uninger concludes that both of the insurance components in the social
security program have a negative impact on growth. First of all the pension system
has a direct negative effect since pensions crowd out savings, and therefore reduce
capital accumulation and growth. Secondly, unemployment insurance has an indirect
negative effect on economic growth by affecting unemployment. The unemployment
benefits influence equilibrium unemployment through the wage bargaining.
To expand on this path of literature I model and compare how different pension
systems affect capital accumulation and growth. To make the comparisons it is
necessary to find analytical solutions for the growth factor of capital. I have therefore
made some substantial changes to the set up by Bra¨uninger. Besides, not only
a fully funded and a pay-as-you go (PAYGO) scheme are considered, but also a
third alternative. This alternative is assumed to be similar to a PAYGO system
with respect to the governmental intervention, but dissimilar with respect to the
financing. Pension payments are here assumed to be financed by a pension fund
governed by the government, and where the young individuals pays taxes to finance
their own generation’s old-age need. But, the system is also non-individualized
and non-actuarial, hence there is no link between tax contribution and pension
benefit. Thus it is not equivalent to an individual and fully funded system, which
is perfectly actuarial.1 I will elaborate on the different pension schemes in section
5.3 and in the conclusion. Addressing policy issues in a setting like this is often
suppressed in the theoretical literature though it is a highly important issue for policy
makers. The question I ask in this paper is therefore how different social security
systems will influence savings, capital formation and growth, in an economy where
wage bargaining leads to long-term unemployment, and the social security system
accordingly comprise old-age pensions and unemployment insurance.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way: Section 2 describes pop-
ulation in an overlapping generation setting. Special attention is given to the two
states possible for a young worker. In section 3, households, lifecycle consumption
1See Fehr and Thøgersen (Forthcoming, 2009) for a survey of different pension schemes and their
effects on future generations.
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and the individual savings function are modeled. Section 4 presents the production
structure of the economy. Firms are assumed to act under monopolistic competi-
tion. This section also studies firms’ interaction with trade unions and the wage
bargaining. In section 5 I describe the government and the different social security
systems. Then, section 6 assesses how capital accumulation and economic growth
are affected by different funding strategies when capital is endogenous. Section 7
offers some concluding remarks.
2 Population and states
I consider a model with two cohorts. Each individual lives in two periods, and
the ones who are young in period t are old in period t + 1. The number of the
young in period t is Nt. Population grows at a constant rate n, and it follows that
Nt+1 = (1+n)Nt ⇔ n = (Nt/Nt−1)−1, where Nt−1 is the number of old in period t.
Young individuals all supply one unit of labor, though they can be in two different
states, either employed or unemployed. The proportion u ∈ (0, 1) is unemployed,
so the total number unemployed and employed are respectively, uNt and (1− u)Nt.
Each of the working individuals earns the wage wt. The wage rate however, is
taxed at a proportional rate τ , in order to finance unemployment insurance (b), and
pensions. To which generation the pension is distributed depends on the pension
system.
3 Households and lifecycle consumption
A representative young agent in generation t will choose a consumption path to
maximize the following lifetime utility function, Ut = U(c1,t, c2,t+1), where U is
strictly concave, increasing in each of its two arguments, c1,t is consumption when
young in period t and c2,t+1 is consumption when the same individual is old in the
next period, t + 1. For analytical purposes I assume a logarithmic Cobb-Douglas
description of the preference structure:
Ut = (1− δ) log c1,t + δ log c2,t+1 , (1)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the weight on consumption in the two periods and reflects the
discount factor. When individuals are young they can either work and earn wt(1−τ),
or they can be unemployed and receive unemployment benefits. The working part
of the population will allocate income between consumption and saving (st). All
savings are allocated to investments which yield a positive rate of return. In the
second period of life individuals are retired and receive a pension benefit along with
a payoff from investments made when young. Pensioners consume all of their wealth,
i.e. the model does not include bequests.
A crucial assumption in the current model is that taxes have distortionary effects.
This assumption is necessary in order to distinguish between real effects of the
two funded pension schemes. Due to the importance of this assumption it will be
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further discussed in the last section. The modeling of the distortion can be done in
several ways. One approach is to let labor supply be endogenous and include leisure
in the utility function. However, such an approach in an overlapping generations
model like the one applied here, would significantly complicate the capital market
equilibrium. The dynamics of capital will then be characterized by a second order
difference equation, that may involve multiple equilibrium paths and non-uniqueness.
Accordingly, I have adopted the approach by Barro (1979) and Bohn (1992). They
argue that taxation involves collection costs and/or misallocation costs that are
imposed on the private economy. Hence, the tax on labor income will impose an
excess burden on workers. This burden will not influence the unemployed since
they do not pay taxes. The excess burden is denoted h(τ), where h′(τ) > 0 and
h(0) = 0. Net labor income of a worker in period t is therefore wt (1− τ − h(τ)).
This simplified modeling of the distortionary effect is not crucial for the qualitative
results of the analysis.
In order to assess effects on economic growth it is convenient to derive an ex-
pression for aggregate savings. Aggregate savings is the sum of the savings made by
the employed and the unemployed. The unemployed workers receive unemployment
benefits while young, and pension benefits while retired. However, the unemployed
workers also divides their income (transfers) between consumption and saving, and
in the aggregate, their intertemporal choice is included. When analyzing growth
implications, it is necessary to express both aggregate savings and potential wealth
accumulation by the government. Whether the government can accumulate financial
capital depends on the pension system. However, I start the exposition by setting up
the intertemporal consumption decision of the working part of the population and
thereby derive an expression for their individual saving. As the young and working
individuals in period t will divide their net income between consumption and saving,
consumption is given by:
c1,t = wt (1− τ − h(τ))− st . (2)
Consumption of the old is given by their benefits and accumulated saving:
c2,t+1 = θwt + stRt+1 , (3)
where Rt denotes the interest factor, and θ < 1 denotes the constant pension ratio.
From (2) and (3) one can derive the intertemporal budget constraint:
c1,t +
1
Rt+1
c2,t+1 = wt (1− τ − h(τ)) + 1
Rt+1
θwt =: Λt , (4)
where Λt denotes net lifecycle income. Equation (4) expresses the net life income
received in the first period, plus the discounted value of pensions received in the
second period of life. The decision problem for young workers born in period t is
to maximize lifetime utility (1) subject to the consolidated budget constraint in (4).
To derive optimal individual savings, it is convenient to define the following savings
5
function:
st := argmax
c1,t c2,t+1
{
U(c1,t, c2,t+1) | c1,t + (Rt+1)−1c2,t+1 = Λt
}
. (5)
Using the Cobb-Douglas specification of the utility function along with the budget
constraints in period t gives optimal individual savings as:
st =
[
δ (1− τ − h(τ))− (1− δ) θ
Rt+1
]
wt . (6)
Equation (6) states that individual savings depends on individual income during
the working period, the tax distortion and the level of pensions. In section 6 I will
include savings made by the unemployed in order to expand and derive an expression
for total savings for all individuals.
4 Firms and wage bargaining
4.1 Technology and market structure
The firms act in a market characterized by monopolistic competition. It is therefore
assumed to be a large number of firms, but all goods are imperfect substitutes such
that there exists some profit to be shared between workers and firms. The sharing
of these profits is a part of the bargaining. Each firm i makes use of two input
factors, capital (Ki,t) and labor (Li,t) in order to produce a variety of goods. The
demand for these goods produced by firm i, is given by Yi,t = pi
−η
i,t Yt, where pii,t is
the relative price of good i, η is the price elasticity of demand and Yt is an index
of aggregate demand. Technology is given by a Cobb-Douglas production function
with positive and diminishing marginal products of each input, constant returns to
scale and labor-augmenting technology for firm i:
Yi,t = Kαi,t (AtLi,t)
β where α+ β = 1, α > 0 and β > 0 . (7)
Effective labor is thus given by AtLi,t, where At measures labor efficiency which each
single firm takes as given. Firms maximize profits Πi,t = Ii,t − wi,tLi,t − Ri,tKi,t,
where Ii,t is revenue and given by pii,tYi,t. It is assumed that capital fully depreciates
each period. Insert the inverse demand function to obtain Ii,t = Y
1/η
t Y
κ
i,t, where
κ := 1 − 1/η. Standard profit maximization implies that the marginal revenue of
respectively capital and labor equals their input prices:
∂Ii,t
∂Li,t
=
βκIi,t
Li,t
= wi,t and
∂Ii,t
∂Ki,t
=
ακIi,t
Ki,t
= Ri,t .
4.2 Aggregate production and technological spillovers
In order to assess growth effects in the aggregate economy, it is necessary to expand
the profit maximizing framework above to include all the agents, employed and
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unemployed. I assume that firms are symmetric hence, in the aggregate Ki,t = Kt
and Yi,t = Yt. It is also assumed that the real wage is determined in the wage
bargaining process as presented in section 4.3. The symmetry of firms imply that
all prices are equal, hence the relative price is pii,t = pi = 1, for all t. The revenue
of each firm will then be equal to output, i.e. Ii,t = Yi,t. Furthermore, as all
firms are assumed to be symmetric, the production function is equal for all firms,
i.e. Yt = Kαt (AtLt)
β . Since young people in generation t either are employed or
unemployed, Lt = (1− u)Nt, and aggregate production is thus given by:
Yt = Kαt [At(1− u)Nt]β . (8)
The profit maximizing first order conditions in section 4.1 is at the aggregate level
given by ακYt/Kt = Rt and βκYt/Lt = wt. Inserting the production function in (8),
gives the first order conditions as:
ακkˆ−βt (1− u)β = Rt and
Atβκkˆ
α
t
(1− u)α = wt , (9)
where kˆt := Kt/AtNt denotes capital per unit of efficient labor. To endogenize
the labor productivity index At, I follow the set up originally formulated by Arrow
(1962), and the extensions by Romer (1986). Following this approach implies a
technological spillover from the size of the aggregate capital stock on labor produc-
tivity in individual firms. This positive externality permits an endogenous growth
process. In order to ensure the existence of a steady-state equilibrium, the tech-
nological spillover is assumed to be linear in the aggregate capital stock per young
individual:
At =
1
a
Kt
Nt
, (10)
where a is a scaling productivity parameter reflecting the influence of capital inten-
sity on labor productivity.2 Moreover, the productivity of labor is decreasing in a.
With respect to the production function, inserting (10) into (8) gives:
Yt = Kt(1− u)βa−β ,
i.e. the production function is of the AK type and linear in capital. Notice that
unemployment reduces output. Such a relation is motivated by the empirical evi-
dence of a negative effect of unemployment on growth.3 In Bra¨uninger (2005), it is
shown that a convenient way to model this aspect is to let the technological spillover
depend on young individuals in general, and not only on the employed individuals.
This feature is captured in (10), and it follows that unemployment has a negative
impact on output and economic growth. From (10) and the definition of kˆt, it follows
that capital per effective unit of labor is constant:
kˆt :=
Kt
AtNt
= a . (11)
2See Grossman and Yanagawa (1993), Wigger (2002) and Holler (2007) for similar approaches.
3See Daveri and Tabellini (2000), and Bra¨uninger and Pannenberg (2002) for empirical studies.
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It is straightforward from (9) to see that the interest factor Rt, and the wage per effi-
cient unit wt/At, are functions of kˆt. Substituting (11) into the first order conditions
in (9) yields:
Rt = ακa−β(1− u)β = R for all t , (12)
wt =
Atβκa
α
(1− u)α . (13)
Thus, the interest factor is constant over time and the wage rate is proportional to
the level of labor productivity, i.e. growing at the rate of growth of the technological
spillover.
4.3 Unions, bargaining and equilibrium unemployment
In this subsection I present the wage setting and the equilibrium unemployment
rate. This is done in order to analyze how unemployment will affect economic
growth under different social security systems. Unemployment is the result of wage
bargaining at firm level. This exposition of the labor market is conventional and can
be found in Booth (1995), Layard et al. (1991) or Bra¨uninger (2005) among others.4
All workers, both employed and unemployed, are members of a trade union,
and the total number of members are therefore Ni. The trade union is assumed to
maximize the utility of a worker, given by net income. The workers can be either
employed in firm i and earn (1 − τ)wi, or have an alternative income mi which
either comes from employment in another firm or as unemployment benefit.5 Each
individual is sometimes unemployed, depending on the outcome of the bargaining
and the exogenous fluctuations in the labor market. It is assumed that the outcome
of the bargaining problem is given by maximization of the Nash product: Φ =
(Vi − V i)γ(Πi − Πi)1−γ , where γ is the relative bargaining power of the union and
Vi = Nivi, where vi is the utility of a member. V i is the threat point of the union,
and is given by the alternative income of a member in case of disagreement, miNi.
Likewise Πi is the threat point of the firm, and is given by the firm’s payoff in case
of disagreement, (−RKi). Using these expressions one obtains the following Nash
product: Φ = (Li ((1− τ)wi −mi))γ (Ii − wiLi)1−γ , and maximization implies:
(1− τ)wi = µmi where µ := 1− γ + γ
βκ
, (14)
i.e. the wage is equal to the alternative income multiplied by a fixed mark-up µ ≥ 1.
The higher the union power, the higher is the mark-up. If the union has no power,
γ = 0⇒ µ = 1, i.e. the firm offers a wage equal to the alternative income.
Union members not employed in firm i faces a probability (1−φu) of being em-
ployed in another firm and a probability φu of staying unemployed. The parameter
φ is exogenous and describes fluctuations in the labor market. These fluctuations
4The modeling of the wage setting follows Layard et al. (1991) and Bra¨uninger (2005), and the
reader is encouraged to address these references for a further discussion.
5I drop time indexation in this part of the exposition.
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take place at much higher frequency than the periods in the overlapping generations
model, so they are not included formally in the model. By assuming that being em-
ployed in another firm gives the worker a net income of (1− τ)w, one can formulate
the following relation for the alternative income: mi = φubw + (1 − φu)(1 − τ)w.
Inserting this equation into (14), one obtains:
(1− τ)wi = µ (φubw + (1− φu)(1− τ)w) . (15)
The assumption of identical firms and homogenous workers, imply wi = w. By
inserting this into (15) and solve for the equilibrium unemployment rate yields:
u =
(µ− 1)(1− τ)
µφ(1− τ − b) , (16)
that is equivalent to Bra¨uninger (2005). The expression shows that equilibrium
unemployment depends on taxes.
5 Government and social security
The government runs a social security system that consists of unemployment ben-
efits, and old-age pension benefits. In order to finance unemployment insurance
the government imposes a tax on the working individuals. This leads to an in-
tragenerational transfer. Pension benefits are also financed by taxing the workers,
but whether the transfer is intergenerational or intragenerational depends on the
pension system. In the following, three different stylized systems are considered,
one unfunded and two funded. While the funded schemes are intragenerational, the
unfunded is intergenerational. The two funded systems differ with respect to the
tax-benefit link, and whether they are individual or not. One system is assumed to
be non-individual and non-actuarial, i.e. a weak tax-benefit link. The other funded
system assumes individual and fully actuarial funding of the pension benefits. Under
a perfect capital market this system is equivalent to a system without governmental
interventions, with respect to total savings and capital accumulation (Blanchard and
Fischer, 1989). Accordingly, it can be analyzed by assuming that pension payments
and their earmarked taxes are zero. Hence, the social security system will only con-
sist of unemployment insurance. As elaborated on in section 5.3, these distinctions
are crucial to the formulation of the governmental budget restrictions.
In the non-actuarial funding system the government accumulates financial wealth.
This is due to the time-lag between income from taxes and the payments to the old.
This implies that the government under certain assumptions will contribute to the
accumulation of national wealth. As will become clear in section 5.3, this is not the
case with the other pension systems.
5.1 National wealth
It is assumed that the economy is closed, which implies that a country’s national
wealth (Ωnt ) consists of the capital in the economy. Since capital can be accumulated
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by the government in the case of a non-actuarial funding system, as well as by
the private sector, Ωnt := Kt = Ω
P
t + Ω
G
t , where Ω
P
t and Ω
G
t denotes the wealth
by the households and the government respectively. The employed workers in the
economy pay taxes to finance the two components of the social security system. The
government distributes these revenues among the entitled ones. For expositional
reasons it is distinguished between taxes paid to finance unemployment insurance
(τu), and taxes paid to finance old-age pensions (τp). The government’s wealth in
the beginning of period t+ 1 is accordingly:
ΩGt+1 = Rt+1Ω
G
t + τpwtNt(1− u)− PNt−1 .
Note that intragenerational transfers from the employed to the unemployed are ex-
cluded, due to their purely within generation distributional characterization. This
part of the tax is not invested and can therefore not contribute to wealth accumu-
lation. The government’s wealth in per worker form is given by:
(1 + n)ωGt+1 = Rt+1ω
G
t + τpwt(1− u)− P (1 + n)−1 , (17)
where ω := Ω/N and P = θwt. The pension P received by the old part of the
population is proportional to the current wage.
5.2 Unemployment insurance
The young and working individuals in period t, (1 − u)Nt, finance unemployment
benefits to the unemployed. These benefits (B) are fixed in relation to wages, B =
bwt, where b < 1 is the replacement ratio. Since the total number of unemployed are
uNt, total expenditures to the unemployed in period t is buwtNt. Since expenditures
must be equal to total taxes earmarked for unemployment benefits, the following
budget restriction with respect to unemployment insurance must hold:
τuwt(1− u)Nt = buwtNt ⇐⇒ τu = bu(1− u) , (18)
which implies that the tax rate with respect to unemployment insurance, is inde-
pendent of the pension system.
5.3 Pension systems
As aforementioned I distinguish between three different stylized pension schemes:
pay-as-you go (PAYGO), non-actuarial funding (NAF) and actuarial funding (AF).
PAYGO financing
Within this regime it is assumed that taxes on labor income to the young part of
the population are used to finance old-age pensions in the same period. This gives
the following budget restriction with respect to pensions:
τpwtNt(1− u) = θwtNt−1 . (19)
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As long as taxes to finance pensioners are paid out in the same period as they are
received, the government can not accumulate wealth. This implies that ΩGt = 0, for
all t. One can then rewrite the restriction and solve for τp:
τp =
θNt−1
(1− u)Nt =
θ
(1− u)(1 + n) .
The total tax levied on the worker under a PAYGO system can then be expressed
as:
τPAY GO = τu + τp =
θ + bu(1 + n)
(1− u)(1 + n) . (20)
The tax is negatively related to n and positively related to the replacement ratio b,
the pension ratio θ, and the unemployment rate u.
Non-actuarial funding
This regime is also assumed to be non-individualized and the representative individ-
ual in each generation will pay taxes that are contributions to his own generation’s
pension fund. This means that the representative individual in the second period
of life will receive a pension that equals his generations’ earlier contributions plus
accumulated interests. As the system is characterized by a non-actuarial relation-
ship between each individual’s contribution as young and his benefit received as old,
the pension received by each individual does not necessarily reflect his contribution
in particular. The government therefore distributes income on a generation basis,
and not on an individual one.6 In this system the government can contribute to the
accumulation of national wealth. The governments financial wealth, ΩGt , is pension
taxes that the government receives in period t− 1, and at the beginning of period t,
the government has Rt+1ΩGt at it’s disposal. This implies that θwtNt−1 = Rt+1ΩGt ,
and that Rt+1ωGt = θwt/(1 + n) in per worker form. By inserting this into (17), it
follows that:
(1 + n)ωGt+1 = τpwt(1− u) . (21)
Equation (21) reveals that taxes paid by the employed in period t, gives the govern-
mental wealth in period t + 1. The budget restriction that characterizes the NAF
strategy is accordingly:
θwtNt = Rt+1τpwtNt(1− u) ⇐⇒ τp = θ
Rt+1(1− u) . (22)
Total tax under a NAF social security system is then given by:
τNAF = τp + τu =
θ + buRt+1
(1− u)Rt+1 . (23)
Equation (23) shows that the tax is now not directly affected by n. The growth
in population will under a NAF regime not have a direct effect on the tax paid by
6A similar approach can be found in Thøgersen (2001).
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workers. From equation (9) however, one can see that population growth have an
impact on the interest rate and therefore an indirect effect on taxes.
Actuarial funding
This regime is also assumed to be individualized so the ordinary payments of the
workers to social security is replaced with contributions to their own individual ac-
counts. Workers save a mandated fraction of their labor income and invest it by
themselves for their own old-age need. Provided that capital markets are perfect,
an individualized and actuarial pension system is equivalent to absence of a pension
system. Thus, the social security system only consist of an unemployment insurance
scheme. Hence, τu > 0 and τp = θ = 0. Moreover, the government can not accumu-
late wealth, i.e. ωGt = 0, for all t. Total taxes on labor income under a AF strategy
is then:
τAF = τp + τu =
bu
(1− u) . (24)
Hence, an actuarial funding strategy implies that taxes are independent of popu-
lation growth, and the real interest factor. Notice also that taxes are lower in the
AF system compared to the NAF system. Therefore, the excess burden of taxes are
relatively higher in the NAF system. This feature illustrates an important difference
between AF and NAF, and is important in the subsequent analysis.
The above analysis shows that the pension system affects the tax levied on
workers.
6 Capital accumulation and alternative social security
systems
This section studies how capital accumulation and growth depend on the choice
of the pension system. To incorporate different funding strategies the model uses
the different governmental budget restrictions from section 5.3. The growth factor is
determined by aggregate savings and capital accumulation. I will therefore derive an
expression for aggregate savings where both the contributions from the employed and
the unemployed are included. Moreover, the analysis of different pension systems
makes it necessary to derive explicit solutions for the growth factor of capital in the
different settings. The following exposition follows Bra¨uninger (2005), and expand
his model by including tax distortions, different pension systems and comparative
studies.
6.1 Aggregate savings
Total savings in the economy is defined as the sum of the savings by the employed
workers and the unemployed individuals. However, as the government can accu-
mulate financial wealth if there is a time-lag between their tax income and social
security payments, their contribution must also be included in the analysis. Thus,
considering the equilibrium in the capital market, involves both total savings and
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governmental savings. Total savings are given by expanding equation (6) to include
all the employed and unemployed workers. The proportion of the employed is (1−u)
and their individual income is (1 − τ)wt. The proportion of the unemployed is u,
and their income is bwt. Aggregate savings are accordingly:
St = δ(1− τ)(1− u)wtNt − δh(τ)(1− u)wtNt
− (1− δ)θwt
Rt+1
(1− u)Nt + δbuwtNt − (1− δ)θwt
Rt+1
uNt .
Notice that the contributions from the employed must correspond to the benefits
received by the unemployed in equilibrium. This means that τu(1 − u)wtNt =
buwtNt, and St can be simplified to:
St = δ(1− u)wtNt [1− τp − h(τ)]− (1− δ)θwt
Rt+1
Nt . (25)
Equation (25) shows that savings depend on the wage rate, the unemployment rate,
the tax distortion and the pension ratio. Savings are however independent of the
replacement ratio. The distortionary effects are in this expression related to the
taxes paid to pensions. Due to this tax distortion aggregate savings are lower, than
they would have been without it.
The pension ratio is important. How changes in the pension ratio will affect
savings depends on the pension system under consideration.
6.2 Equilibrium conditions and capital accumulation
In period t, the equilibrium in the economy as a whole is defined by equilibrium
in three markets: the labor market, the capital market and the final good market.
In the labor market, equilibrium is given by Lt = (1 − u)Nt, which follows since a
positive part of the population is at any time unemployed. The final good market
equilibrium displays the resource constraint for the economy as a whole , and states
that output can either be used for aggregate consumption Ct, or gross investment
in period t:
Yt = Ct +Kt+1 , (26)
where
Ct := Ntc1,t +Nt−1c2,t , (27)
i.e. aggregate consumption is the sum of consumption by the young and the old
individuals in period t.
As the depreciation rate of capital is assumed to be unity, capital evolves ac-
cording to Kt+1 = St. In the capital market the supply of capital comes from both
private and governmental savings. The governments financial wealth is therefore
essential in the consideration of the equilibrium condition for the capital market.
The next period’s capital is therefore given as
Kt+1 = St +ΩGt+1 , (28)
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where aggregate savings by the private sector is given by equation (25). By dividing
aggregate savings by Nt, one obtain savings per young individual, including both
employed and unemployed. The dynamic behavior of capital per young individual
is accordingly (1+n)kt+1 = St/Nt+(1+n)ωGt+1, where kt := Kt/Nt denotes capital
per young individual. Thus, inserting (25) and (17) gives the dynamics of capital in
the economy as:
(1 + n)kt+1 = δ(1− u)wt [1− τp − h(τ)]
− (1− δ)θwt
Rt+1
+Rt+1ωGt + τpwt(1− u)−
θwt
1 + n
.
(29)
The dynamic equilibrium in (29) is fundamental in the subsequent analysis of how
social security and different public pension regimes affects the growth of capital in
the economy. The long-run growth factor of capital in the economy is defined by:
g :=
kt+1
kt
. (30)
To obtain analytical expressions for the growth factor the following equations are
necessary: the intertemporal equilibrium in (29), the first order conditions in (12)
and (13), and to separate between different pension systems one need the governmen-
tal budget restrictions in (19), (22) and (24). It is also necessary to insert whether
the government’s wealth is equal to zero or not between two periods. Moreover, the
following result turns out to be quite useful:
Lemma 1 The structure of the technological spillover applied in the production sec-
tor implies that wt/kt = const. for all t.
Proof. Inserting (10) into (13) becomes:
wt
kt
=
Atβκa
α
kt(1− u)α =
βκ
(1− u)αaβ ,
which is constant.
6.3 Comparing funding strategies
6.3.1 PAYGO financing
In a PAYGO system an increase in the pension ratio will affect savings in two ways.
First, it increases the contributions of the young, so that their net income declines.
Secondly, it affects the young generations motivation to save, since part of their
consumption as old is financed by the next generations tax payments. Moreover,
with a PAYGO pension scheme the government can not contribute to national wealth
as all governmental transfers are intergenerational, and tax income obtained in one
period are transferred to pensioners within the same period. Hence, ΩGt = ω
G
t = 0,
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for all t. To implement the governmental budget restriction into the growth factor
defined in (30), it is convenient to solve equation (19) for the pension ratio θ. This
implies:
θ = τp(1− u)(1 + n) , (31)
where (1+n)(1−u) is the ratio of employed workers in period t, relative to all workers
in period t− 1. If population growth exceeds the ratio between the unemployment
rate and the employment rate (1 − u), then the pension ratio exceeds the pension
tax.
Inserting (31) and ωGt+1 = 0 into (29) gives:
(1 + n)kt+1 =
{
δ [1− τp − h(τ)]− (1− δ)τp(1 + n)
Rt+1
}
(1− u)wt , (32)
which displays the dynamic behavior of capital with a PAYGO pension scheme.
Inserting (12), (32) and Lemma 1 into (30), yields the following growth factor:
gPAY GO =
{
δ [1− τp − h(τ)]
1 + n
− (1− δ)τp
R
}
βκ(1− u)β
aβ
. (33)
Note that the growth factor is time invariant. It is straightforward to see that
unemployment reduces the growth in capital. The reason for this is that unemploy-
ment leads to reduced output, lower aggregate income and therefore lower savings.
Moreover, an increase in the pension tax, decrease savings by young individuals and
consequently the growth factor. Formally:
∂gPAY GO
∂τp
= −
{
[1 + h′(τ)] δ
1 + n
+
(1− δ)
R
}
βκ(1− u)β
aβ
< 0 .
6.3.2 Non-actuarial funding
As aforementioned, the NAF funding strategy implies that the young working gen-
eration finances its own pension, but on a generation basis, and not on an individual
one. The intragenerational characterization of the NAF system also implies that the
pension ratio is independent of population growth. In section 5.3, it was shown that
the government can contribute to the national wealth, due to the time-lag between
tax income and pension payments. Hence, the government accumulates wealth ac-
cording to (21). To derive the growth factor in an economy with a NAF pension
scheme, it is necessary to solve the governmental budget restriction given in (22) for
the pension ratio. This implies:
θ = τp(1− u)Rt+1 . (34)
Using (21) and (34), the dynamic behavior of capital per young individual within
this pension regime becomes:
(1 + n)kt+1 = [1− h(τ)] δ(1− u)wt . (35)
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Consequently, the growth factor is derived by inserting (35) and Lemma 1 into (30):
gNAF =
βδκ [1− h(τ)] (1− u)β
(1 + n)aβ
. (36)
Hence, the growth factor is time invariant. As in the PAYGO program, unemploy-
ment and pension taxes reduce growth. The negative impact of the tax is due to
the distortionary effect that remains, as long as the working generation pays taxes.
The following proposition compares the PAYGO pension scheme with the NAF
scheme, with respect to impact on the growth factor of capital.
Proposition 1 Capital accumulation is higher in an economy with a NAF pension
system, than in an economy with a PAYGO pension system, i.e. gNAF > gPAY GO.
Proof. The proposition is proved by contradiction. By assuming that gPAY GO ≥
gNAF , and utilizing the expressions in (33) and (36), it follows that:
gPAY GO ≥ gNAF ⇒{
δ [1− τp − h(τ)]
1 + n
− (1− δ)τp
R
}
βκ(1− u)β
aβ
≥ βδκ [1− h(τ)] (1− u)
β
(1 + n)aβ
⇔ δ [1− τp − h(τ)]− (1 + n)(1− δ)τp
R
≥ δ [1− h(τ)] ,
which verifies a contradiction as τp > 0, and the second term on the LHS is greater
than zero.
The reason for this result lies in the government’s contribution to the economy’s
total savings through a pension fund. Establishing a public social security fund and
thereby accumulating financial wealth, the government indirectly stimulates capital
accumulation. In this system the government accumulates financial wealth because
of the time-lag between when taxes are received by the government and when it is
transferred to the older generation. Hence, an important difference between this
system and the PAYGO system is that the government now contributes to capital
accumulation.
According to neoclassical growth theory capital accumulation will increase the
growth rate temporary. In this model however we also get a permanent increase in
growth, since accumulation of capital increases the stock of knowledge and positive
spillovers stimulates perpetual growth.
6.3.3 Actuarial funding
The main point within this system is that individuals pay contributions to their
own individual accounts. As noted in section 5.3, this implies that τp = θ = 0.
But the employed workers still pay taxes in order to finance unemployment benefit.
This implies that τu > 0. Under a PAYGO and a NAF strategy, the tax consists of
both τu and τp. Consequently, since τ = τu + τp > τu and h′(τ) > 0, the following
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inequality applies, h(τ) > h(τu), i.e. the tax distortion is lower compared with the
other social security programs.
The government has no opportunity to accumulate wealth in the AF system, as
the only tax received is intragenerational, i.e. ωGt = 0, for all t. By inserting these
assumptions and corollaries into equation (29) one obtains the equilibrium dynamics
in the capital market as:
(1 + n)kt+1 = [1− h(τu)] δ(1− u)wt . (37)
Comparing capital dynamics in the NAF system given by (35), and in the AF system,
shows that the only feature that separates the social security programs is the size of
the tax distortion h(·). Due to the lower tax in the AF program, the excess burden
is higher in the NAF program.
Accordingly, the growth factor in the economy with an AF social security system
is by inserting (37) and Lemma 1 into (30):
gAF =
βδκ [1− h(τu)] (1− u)β
(1 + n)aβ
, (38)
hence, the growth factor is time invariant. Inspection of (38) shows that the tax
distortion still exists, but is now lower compared with the other pension systems.
This follows as the total tax rate on wages is now lower.
The following proposition compares capital accumulation in an economy with a
NAF pension program and an economy with an AF pension program.
Proposition 2 Capital accumulation is higher in an economy with an AF pension
system, than in an economy with a NAF pension system, i.e. gAF > gNAF .
Proof. The proposition is showed by contradiction. By assuming that gNAF ≥
gAF , and utilizing the expressions in (33) and (38), it follows that:
gNAF ≥ gAF ⇒
βδκ [1− h(τ)] (1− u)β
(1 + n)aβ
≥ βδκ [1− h(τu)] (1− u)
β
(1 + n)aβ
⇔ h(τ) ≤ h(τu) .
Since h(τ) > h(τu), the inequality is not fulfilled and the proof is complete.
Individual net income is higher under an AF pension system than under a NAF
system. This is due to both smaller taxes and smaller tax distortions. The govern-
ment can not contribute to national wealth in an AF program as the unemployment
tax is intergenerational and distributed within the cohort. However, the individuals
in the economy compensate for this element by saving a larger proportion of their
income. And as the tax and the collection costs are lower, the net income is higher.
Therefore, total savings capital accumulation are greater in an economy with an AF
social security scheme.
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Another feature on individual and actuarial pension schemes, is that the mo-
tivation to save is higher within this system, than under a non-individualized and
non-actuarial pension system. This is due to the one-to-one connection between
individuals payments and received pensions (Sørensen et al., 2006).
7 Conclusion
In several European countries, population ageing, unemployment and economic
growth are much debated issues among professional economists and politicians.
These issues are highly related through the social security system.
Corneo and Marquardt (2000) consider a model where individuals live for two
periods. In the first period, individuals can be either employed or unemployed, and
in the second period they are all retired. Due to this structure the social security
system refers to a combination of public pensions and unemployment insurance
programs. A main point in Corneo and Marquardt is that unemployment is caused
by the union wage setting. In their model the labor market is characterized by a
monopoly union that determines the wage.
Bra¨uninger (2005) expands the model of Corneo and Marquardt to include wage
bargaining at an intermediate level. The labor market is therefore characterized by
a Nash bargaining solution, rather than a monopoly trade union.
The current paper contributes to this theoretical literature by expanding Bra¨un-
inger’s model to include three different pension schemes. Moreover, the set up of
the model makes it possible to compare the different pension schemes with respect
to growth implications. The PAYGO and the AF system are fairly standard in the
literature, except for the inclusion of long-term unemployment. However, the NAF
system is rarely considered, and represents the counterpart to a fully funded system,
regarding the tax-benefit link and the degree of individualism.
To distinguish real effects of the two funded schemes, it is necessary to assume
some sort of distortion in the economy. In the current set up, this is done via the
excess burden on workers, due to tax payments. If h(τ) = 0, the NAF and the AF
schemes would be equivalent with respect to capital accumulation and output.
The second novel part of the paper lies in the combination of the modeling
of the pension systems and the endogenous growth framework, that permits an
analytical solution of the growth factor of capital. To be able to express the growth
factor explicit, the technological spillover is assumed to be linear in capital intensity.
Moreover, to simplify the growth model compared with some of the earlier literature,
I model the growth factor in terms of per young individual. These simplifications
makes it possible to do a comparative analysis of the different pension systems.
It is shown that growth is higher in an economy with a NAF system rather than
a PAYGO system. The result depends on the governmental contribution to national
wealth and thereby capital accumulation, within the NAF scheme. Comparing the
two funding strategies, reveals than an individual and actuarial pension scheme,
foster higher growth than the non-individualized and non-actuarial pension scheme.
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